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The article aims to reveal the gist of the most recent political relations between Russia 
and Georgia. Of all Russia’s neighbors, the tensest relations have developed with 
Georgia, a small Caucasian state striving to carry out an independent policy oriented 
toward the West. The author shows that the relations between the two countries can 
best be characterized as those between a strong and a weak neighbor, a scenario well 
known from the classics of the international relations theory. 
 
According to the specific laws governing international relations and the accepted 
game rules, each sovereign state, no matter how small and weak, should primarily 
consider its own interests. Due to the new circumstances, particularly its incorporation 
into the international political and economic system, Georgia has begun to gradually 
develop new ties and, naturally, distance itself from Russia. 
 
Of all the CIS countries, it is Georgia that maintains the closest relations with the U.S. 
and has declared its intentions to join NATO. Georgia believes its strategic goal to be 
integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.1 It has many challenging 
domestic and foreign problems, but the most acute is perhaps its relations with Russia, 
which is conducting a tough policy of pressure on its little neighbor. 
 
Georgia’s relations with Russia are the most serious problem of its national security 
and, consequently, its foreign policy. They leave much to be desired, and their current 
state cannot be considered a diplomatic or foreign policy achievement for either 
Georgia or Russia.2 
 
Interrelations between Georgia and Russia are developing in keeping with the 
provisions of the international relations theory, which, when defining the place and 
opportunities of small countries in the international system, notes the following, 
among other things: 
 
1. It is extremely dangerous for a small country to be the neighbor of a large and 
powerful nation; 
 
2. A small country should act extremely cautiously in its relations with a powerful 
neighbor; it does not have the right to make a strategic mistake, such mistakes can 
sometimes be tantamount to suicide; 
 
3. Diplomacy is essentially the only foreign policy tool a small country can possess. 
 
It is no secret that Russian policy is striving to return Georgia to the Russian orbit and 
establish a pro-Russian leadership in this country. It is prepared to go to any lengths to 
achieve its goals. At present, and in the near future, Russia does not and will not have 
enough resources or desire to play a constructive role with respect to Georgia, that is, 
help it “to get back on its feet” and build a contemporary stable democratic state with 
a new economy. Russia has too many serious economic, demographic, and 
sociopolitical problems of its own. The Northern Caucasus is a good case in point. 
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Russia is objectively interested in the long run of having stable states with well 
developing economies among its neighbors in the Southern Caucasus, providing 
favorable conditions for Russian business, particularly since geographical and 
historical circumstances are conducive to establishing constructive, good neighborly, 
and friendly relations. Despite all their resentments against Russia, politicians, and the 
Georgian people as a whole, understand the value of positive relations with Russia, 
hoping to have it as a strong, healthy, and rich neighbor. Otherwise, there will be no 
order at all in the Eurasian space. 
 
It is not in Georgia’s interests to spoil its relations with its northern neighbor. The 
economic advantages of friendship with Russia and the established cultural and 
kindred ties between the people of both countries aside, a political confrontation with 
the Russian Federation is fraught with serious, if not fatal, consequences for Georgia, 
which Russia has repeatedly given its small and weak neighbor to understand. This 
seeming imprudence on Georgia’s part casts aspersions on the ability of its political 
leadership to adequately assess the situation and make realistic decisions. This is 
precisely what the Russian military-political elite is accusing the Georgian leadership 
of, while continuing to put pressure on its weak neighbor. But is the Georgian 
leadership, which is allegedly striving to hinder Russia in every way and not taking 
into account the vital interests of its powerful neighbor, really so imprudent? 
 
Georgia’s foreign political orientation is determined by its strategic goal to integrate 
into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures. This goal logically ensues from the 
fact that since Georgia is a multiethnic and polyconfessional state, democracy is vital 
to it for balancing the interests among the diverse groups of its population. Georgia 
will be unable to survive if it does not become a truly democratic state. 
 
In its efforts to return Georgia to its fold, Russia has been unable to offer its weak 
neighbor any kind of attractive model. On the contrary, it tried and is still trying to put 
pressure on Georgia, primarily by taking advantage of its internal weakness, which 
ensues from its ethnic and confessional diversity. With its authoritarian inclinations, 
Russia could and would not want to help Georgia become a democratic state. Keeping 
in mind the current political processes in the Russian Federation (particularly the 
situation in the Northern Caucasus), becoming a Russian satellite would mean that 
Georgia would lose its historical opportunity to build a contemporary democratic 
nation and state, that is, it would lose its national perspective. This, and not its disdain 
for Russia, explains why the Georgian political elite is striving to make the country 
part of the Euro-Atlantic community. 
 
Russia’s Interests 
 
It goes without saying that the Caucasus is extremely important to Russia, which is 
confirmed by the centuries-long attempts by the Russian Empire to penetrate the 
Caucasus and Russia’s (first imperial and then Soviet) almost two-century-long 
activity in this strategically important region. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. and 
emergence in the Southern Caucasus of three independent states (Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, and Georgia) is forcing Russia to adapt to the rapidly changing geopolitical 
situation. Used to applying and demonstrating its might, the Russian Federation is 
trying to reanimate its status as a great power, primarily by restoring control over the 
former Soviet republics. It is the Russian military-political elite’s objective to remain 
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in the Southern Caucasus, and it cannot imagine achieving this without turning 
Georgia into its satellite. 
 
Georgia is a key country for Russian politicians. And keeping in mind the current 
situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia, if Russia does not retain its control over 
Georgia, not only will it be unable to restore control over the Southern Caucasus, but 
it will also be unable to claim a role as a major player in the region.3 Control over 
Georgia will allow Russia not only to control the entire Southern Caucasus, but also 
to feel confident in the Northern Caucasus, where things are not going as the Russian 
leadership would like. 
 
Control over Georgia will allow Russia to have an obstacle in the south that can hold 
back Turkey’s influence on the former Soviet Turkic-speaking republics and peoples. 
Control over Georgia will make it possible to cut off energy resource-rich Azerbaijan 
from the West by closing its access through Georgia to the Black Sea. Control over 
Georgia will allow Russia to interfere in the creation of a Europe-Asia corridor and 
transit routes between Central Asia and Europe via the Southern Caucasus, as well as 
retain its monopoly in transporting energy resources and other commodities from 
Central and Eastern Asia to Europe. Control over Georgia will allow Russia to retain 
its major military presence in the Black Sea. By controlling Georgia and, 
consequently, the entire Southern Caucasus, Russia can ensure its significant 
influence on the Middle East countries. What is more, control over Georgia will 
provide Russia with convenient contact with its only ally in the Caucasus—
Armenia—which due to historical circumstances is wary of Turkey and hostile toward 
Azerbaijan, occupying almost 1/5 of the latter’s territory. 
 
These reasons, for which Russian politicians believe that Georgia should be kept in 
Russia’s military-political orbit, are the powerful factor compelling the Russian 
Federation to constantly put pressure on Georgia and accuse it of conducting an anti-
Russian policy. 
 
Tense Relations 
 
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became clear that Russia did not 
want to leave the Southern Caucasus. This was confirmed primarily by the actions of 
the Russian military in this region and in particular their “contribution” to 
destabilization in the Southern Caucasus by supporting separatism in the region’s 
countries and fomenting ethnopolitical conflicts.4 The Russian Federation has always 
viewed the Caucasus as an exclusively vital strategic region, retention of control over 
which is perceived as a vitally important priority of Russia’s national security.5 
 
As a strategically key country for the Russian Federation, Georgia was placed under 
significant pressure of the latter, which increased even more after 1999 when 
Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia. Independence proved to be an extremely 
arduous test for the small post-Soviet state. Georgia must not only resolve very 
difficult problems relating to building its statehood and a new economy, but also has 
to bear the immense pressure exerted on it by its powerful neighbor Russia, which is 
willing to go to any lengths to remain in Georgia. 
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Small countries have a particularly hard time if they border on much stronger states.6 
In Georgia’s case, its neighbor is Russia, its former “landlord” (during the Russian 
Empire and then the Soviet Union) and a former superpower, which is still hoping to 
regain this status and is trying to retain its supremacy or at least influence in its former 
dominions—its newly independent neighbors. 
 
The asymmetry of the post-Soviet space in the security sphere is making it possible 
for Russia to put pressure on its much weaker small neighbors. It is no coincidence 
that Russia’s closest entourage was defined at the beginning of the 1990s as the Near 
Abroad, where Russia wanted to play a special role and enjoy special rights. When 
speaking about the countries of the Near Abroad, the then chairman of the State Duma 
Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin said: 
“With all due respect for these states, many of them are doomed to become our 
satellites or die. I see their territorial integrity in precisely these terms.”7 
 
Admittedly, since then much has changed in international politics, in Russia itself, 
and in the region, but Russia has not taken any constructive steps so far in its relations 
with the Southern Caucasus, particularly with Georgia. However, Russia is not 
slackening its pressure on Georgia, which confirms the immutability of Russia’s 
strategic interests toward Georgia. 
 
Since 1999, after the beginning of the second Chechen war, Russian-Georgian 
relations have become even more unfriendly. Sometimes they improve slightly, but on 
the whole they remain extremely unsociable, if not downright inhospitable. Many 
Russian analysts and parliamentary deputies define Georgia as “the only country in 
the world with the audacity to conduct an anti-Russian policy.”8 In the Russian mass 
media, Georgia always figures as a state unfriendly toward the Russian Federation, 
headed by people who hate Russia (first Eduard Shevardnadze, and now Mikhail 
Saakashvili), and used by the United States in its intrigues against Russia, while the 
latter is only striving to protect its own legal interests. If we compare Russia’s 
relations with various post-Soviet states, we can see that its relations with Georgia are 
the worst. To be more precise, Russia permitted and still permits itself to carry out 
actions with respect to Georgia that it does not permit itself to carry out with respect 
to other post-Soviet states or neighboring countries. 
 
Many analysts note that the beginning of Georgia’s independence was not only very 
painful and dramatic, but its relations with Russia were also the most antagonistic and 
tense.9 The post-Soviet chaos and anarchy in the Southern Caucasus and particularly 
in Georgia were not conducive either to developing the economy or to conducting a 
rational domestic and foreign policy. Post-Soviet Georgia did not have a mature 
political elite from the very beginning (where was it to get it from?) capable of 
restraining the genie of ethnic nationalism released by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which embroiled not only Georgia, but also the whole of the Caucasus in 
bloody conflicts. 
 
The government of President Z. Gamsakhurdia was not only unable to have a 
constructive impact on the sociopolitical processes in Georgia, but with its clumsy 
policy and nationalistic rhetoric also caused an increase in the social and ethnic 
contradictions leading to the civil war and ethnopolitical conflicts in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. 
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Russia managed to mortify extremely weak, but obstinate Georgia after 
Shevardnadze, having de facto lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia, was left with no 
other choice but to agree under Russian pressure to join the CIS in 1993 and sign an 
agreement on granting Russia the use of military bases in Georgia for 25 years. At the 
last moment, Shevardnadze managed to include two items in the agreement on the 
bases obligating Russia to help Georgia restore its territorial integrity and assist in the 
building of Georgia’s armed forces. If Russia did not fulfill these obligations, this 
agreement could not come into force. But the agreement was never ratified by the 
Georgian parliament, although the latter ratified a large so-called framework 
agreement between Georgia and Russia as early as 1994. 
 
It should be stressed that the large agreement mentioned was not ratified by the 
Russian State Duma (President Yeltsin did not even dare suggest that the Russian 
parliament ratify it, being well-aware of the anti-Georgian moods of most of its 
members).10 Not until 2002 (!), did talks begin, at the suggestion of the Georgian 
side, to draw up an agreement on the fundamental principles of friendly relations 
between Georgia and the Russian Federation, which was supposed to create a legal 
base for Georgian-Russian relations. 
 
At first, work on this agreement was quite successful, although, according to 
unofficial Georgian sources, the Russian side demanded from the very beginning that 
the Georgians include a formulation on strategic partnership between the two sides. 
There were also other demands, which bogged down work on the agreement,11 and 
the foreign policy situation was not conducive to its successful continuation.12 
 
This was when Russia stepped up its pressure on Georgia, accusing it of harboring 
Chechen militants (terrorists, in Russia’s interpretation) in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, 
and Russian aviation fired several times on Georgian border zones. 
 
Moscow saw to it that the Pankisi Gorge became the central theme in Russian-
Georgian relations in 2002-2003, and it even overshadowed the conflicts. In light of 
the campaign launched against international terrorism, this even placed Georgia in a 
disadvantageous position on the international arena and presented Russia practically 
as a victim of terrorist acts emanating from Georgia. Only timely action by the OSCE 
and its monitoring on the Russian-Georgian border, diplomatic moves by the U.S., 
and its assistance to Georgia through the Train and Equip military program averted 
the country from danger and made it possible for its security ministries to establish 
control over the Pankisi Gorge. 
 
Relations after the Rose Revolution 
 
Mikhail Saakashvili and his associates who came to power in Georgia in the wake of 
the Rose Revolution announced radical improvement of relations with Russia to be 
their foreign policy priority from the very beginning. Tbilisi even called on Moscow 
to “start relations from scratch,” and a positive mood was in the offing in contacts 
between the two countries. But soon the new Georgian leadership was given to 
understand that Moscow would not tolerate Georgia’s strivings to “enter Europe” and 
could not accept Georgia being friendly with the West and with its northern neighbor 
at the same time.13 By 2005, Russian-Georgian relations again assumed negative 
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tones: the Russian Federation began accusing the Georgian leadership of conducting 
an anti-Russian, irresponsible policy, and Tbilisi, in turn, began accusing Moscow of 
conducting an imperial policy. 
 
At the beginning of 2006, when Georgia activated its policy with respect to NATO, 
Russia resorted to tough measures and essentially placed an embargo on the import of 
several Georgian agricultural products, as well as wines (the Russian market accounts 
for approximately 80% of the export of all Georgia’s wine production). Although the 
Wine War with Georgia began supposedly for sanitary reasons, experts have no doubt 
that big politics is behind this decision by Russia, as this prohibitory measure was 
undertaken precisely when relations between the two countries reached their most 
hostile point.14 
 
On 10 April, 2006, Russia opened up the border with Abkhazia for foreigners.15 A 
few weeks earlier, Gennadi Bukaev—assistant to Russian Government Chairman 
Mikhail Fradkov—said at a joint assembly (!) of the North and South Ossetian 
governments that the Russian leadership had made a fundamental decision about the 
annexation of South Ossetia.16 Should it be considered a constructive approach to the 
settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts? Russia is continuing to adhere to a policy of 
double standards in its relations with Georgia by respecting the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Georgia in words, while taking two Georgian territories—
Abkhazia and South Ossetia—under its military control and assisting their separation 
from Georgia in practice. Russia has granted its citizenship to thousands of residents 
of these territories. It has also instituted visa conditions with respect to Georgia and, 
violating its sovereignty, introduced special privileged conditions on the Abkhazian 
and South Ossetian sections of the Georgian border, which is another step toward 
incorporating the two separatist territories of a neighboring sovereign state. Russia’s 
official representatives, the heads of ministries and other departments, and State 
Duma deputies are visiting Abkhazia, while Russian organizations and private 
persons, despite protests from the Georgians, are privatizing Abkhazian land and 
property.17 Since 2003, large numbers of Abkhazians and South Ossetians have been 
granted Russian citizenship. 
 
Russian expert Mikhail Alexandrov claims that Georgia is the main threat to peace 
and security in the region, and that it is carrying out the most destabilizing policy. 
“Provoking powerful geopolitical opposition, it unambiguously declared its striving to 
join NATO.”18 He also believes that “…Russia’s efforts in this respect should consist 
of three elements: first—deterring Georgia, second—not permitting the 
internationalization of the conflicts, and third—assisting political transformation 
within Georgia.”19 
 
Mr. Alexandrov goes even further and clearly articulates: “…this is how we would 
like to see revived Georgia. In my view, three main principles should be put forward 
in relation to Georgia: democracy, federalism, and neutrality.”20 Against the 
background of the above-mentioned, i.e., the call “to assist political transformation 
within Georgia,” Mr. Alexandrov’s opinion about what Georgian democracy should 
be like is especially interesting: “The development of democracy in Georgia should 
mean that pro-Russian politicians receive equal opportunities for carrying out their 
activity as those opportunities enjoyed by the party in power.”21 A truer word was 
never spoken, as they say. 
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Is There a Solution? 
 
The Caucasus is practically a world champion among the regions in terms of number 
of unrecognized territories declaring themselves to be states. The settlement of 
ethnopolitical conflicts in the region is still problematic, primarily due to Russia’s 
unconstructive position. And, most important, this is making it difficult to see ways to 
develop full-fledged regional cooperation. The Caucasus’ future is the future of the 
region, and not of separate countries. In this respect, we can only set our hopes on 
progress in the economic sphere and on the economic interests of the regional nations. 
It appears that business will help to resolve the problems created by the politicians 
and the military. 
 
One aspect should be singled out in the relations between the two countries. Georgia 
is trying, without perceptible success so far, to internationalize its problems relating to 
separatism, while Russia is stubbornly trying, and so far successfully, to retain its 
essentially key role in resolving ethnopolitical conflicts. The international community 
is tolerating this situation for the moment, but Russia’s unconstructive approach 
toward settling the conflicts is prolonging the crisis in the region. 
 
Russian-Georgian relations leave much to be desired, to put it mildly. The reasons for 
this are Russia’s loathing to lose control over Georgia and the decision of the 
Georgian political elite to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic community. It 
would seem that we are faced with two mutually exclusive viewpoints and a situation 
where compromise is impossible. Consequently, “the winner takes all” principle is 
taking the upper hand. Analyst Mikhail Alexandrov quoted above concludes that “it is 
essentially impossible to resolve the problems under the current Georgian leadership, 
political transformation within Georgia itself is needed to resolve them.”22 The same 
Mr. Alexandrov believes that Russian-Georgian relations have gone past the point of 
no return, and he does not see any way of holding a constructive dialog.23 This 
viewpoint does not leave any hope for improving relations and is deprived of 
elementary self-criticism. 
 
Another well-known Russian analyst, Sergei Markedonov, claims when analyzing 
Russian-Georgian relations that “policy in the Southern Caucasus is undergoing a 
systemic crisis and that Moscow, perhaps for the first time in the post-Soviet period, 
has come up against political will and consistency in the Caucasus… Russia’s 
Caucasian policy should finally acquire meaning and its own image and stop acting as 
a stepdaughter of Soviet policy.”24 
 
Politics is the art of compromise, even if we are dealing with a knowingly weak side. 
Crude pressure does not always yield the desirable results. Georgia, as already 
mentioned, sees its chance of survival in creating a democratic state and integrating 
into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures. And in so doing, the scenario of the 
development of relations between Russia and Georgia could be normal, without 
mutual distrust and the fear of weakening their own national security. An atmosphere 
of mutual trust should indeed be created and policy conducted in keeping with 
civilized game rules. Russian-Georgian relations lack the desire to cooperate and 
respect each other’s legal interests. 
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The Southern Caucasus, and particularly Georgia, is increasingly becoming a target of 
the world community’s interest. Recently, Europe began reconsidering its energy 
policy, in which the Southern Caucasus and Georgia could play a more important role 
than before. Georgia is slowly but surely moving toward membership in NATO; its 
leaders are always ready to enter a dialog with Russia on the legal interests of both 
countries, although this dialog, to our immense regret, has become the victim of the 
extremely reactionary and imperial forces of its powerful northern neighbor. 
 
Relations between Georgia and Russia are like a barometer reflecting the situation 
throughout the Caucasus. If Russia manages to return Georgia to its military-political 
orbit, this might have serious consequences for the security architecture in Europe and 
the Euro-Atlantic structures. 
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